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Abstract. We study the problem of releasing k-way marginals of a
database D 2 (f0;1g
d)
n, while preserving dierential privacy. The an-
swer to a k-way marginal query is the fraction of D's records x 2 f0;1g
d
with a given value in each of a given set of up to k columns. Marginal
queries enable a rich class of statistical analyses of a dataset, and de-
signing ecient algorithms for privately releasing marginal queries has
been identied as an important open problem in private data analysis
(cf. Barak et. al., PODS '07).
We give an algorithm that runs in time d
O(
p
k) and releases a private
summary capable of answering any k-way marginal query with at most
:01 error on every query as long as n  d
O(
p
k). To our knowledge, ours
is the rst algorithm capable of privately releasing marginal queries with
non-trivial worst-case accuracy guarantees in time substantially smaller
than the number of k-way marginal queries, which is d
(k) (for k  d).
1 Introduction
Consider a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n in which each of the n = jDj rows corre-
sponds to an individual's record, and each record consists of d binary attributes.
The goal of privacy-preserving data analysis is to enable rich statistical analyses
on the database while protecting the privacy of the individuals. In this work,
we seek to achieve dierential privacy [6], which guarantees that no individual's
data has a signicant inuence on the information released about the database.
One of the most important classes of statistics on a dataset is its marginals. A
marginal query is specied by a set S  [d] and a pattern t 2 f0;1gjSj. The query
asks, \What fraction of the individual records in D has each of the attributes
? A full version of this paper appears on arXiv [19].
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gift from Google, Inc.j 2 S set to tj?" A major open problem in privacy-preserving data analysis
is to eciently create a dierentially private summary of the database that
enables analysts to answer each of the 3d marginal queries. A natural subclass of
marginals are k-way marginals, the subset of marginals specied by sets S  [d]
such that jSj  k.
Privately answering marginal queries is a special case of the more general
problem of privately answering counting queries on the database, which are
queries of the form, \What fraction of individual records in D satisfy some
property q?" Early work in dierential privacy [5,2,6] showed how to approxi-
mately answer any set of of counting queries Q by perturbing the answers with
appropriately calibrated noise, providing good accuracy (say, within :01 of the
true answer) as long as jDj & jQj1=2.
In a setting where the queries arrive online, or are known in advance, it may
be reasonable to assume that jDj & jQj1=2. However, many situations necessitate
a non-interactive data release, where the data owner computes and publishes a
single dierentially private summary of the database that enables analysts to
answer a large class of queries, say all k-way marginals for a suitable choice of
k. In this case jQj = d(k), and it may be impractical to collect enough data to
ensure jDj & jQj1=2. Fortunately, the remarkable work of Blum et. al. [3] and
subsequent renements [7,9,17,13,12,11], have shown how to privately release ap-
proximate answers to any set of counting queries, even when jQj is exponentially
larger than jDj. For example, these algorithms can release all k-way marginals
as long as jDj  ~ (k
p
d). Unfortunately, all of these algorithms have running
time at least 2d, even when jQj is the set of 2-way marginals (and this is inherent
for algorithms that produce \synthetic data" [20]; as discussed below).
Given this state of aairs, it is natural to seek ecient algorithms capable of
privately releasing approximate answers to marginal queries even when jDj  dk.
A recent series of works [10,4,14] have shown how to privately release answers to
k-way marginal queries with small average error (over various distributions on
the queries) with both running time and minimum database size much smaller
than dk (e.g. dO(1) for product distributions [10,4] and minfdO(
p
k);dO(d
1=3)g
for arbitrary distributions [14]). Hardt et. al. [14] also gave an algorithm for
privately releasing k-way marginal queries with small worst-case error and min-
imum database size much smaller than dk. However the running time of their
algorithm is still d(k), which is polynomial in the number of queries.
In this paper, we give the rst algorithms capable of releasing k-way marginals
up to small worst-case error, with both running time and minimum database size
substantially smaller than dk. Specically, we show how to create a private sum-
mary in time dO(
p
k) that gives approximate answers to all k-way marginals as
long as jDj is at least dO(
p
k). When k = d, our algorithm runs in time 2
~ O(
p
d),
and is the rst algorithm for releasing all marginals in time 2o(d).
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
In this paper, we give faster algorithms for releasing marginals and other classes
of counting queries.Theorem 1 (Releasing Marginals). There exists a constant C such that for
every k;d;n 2 N with k  d, every  2 (0;1], and every " > 0, there is an
"-dierentially private sanitizer that, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, runs
in time jDjdC
p
k log(1=) and releases a summary that enables computing each of
the k-way marginal queries on D up to an additive error of at most , provided
that jDj  dC
p
k log(1=)=".
For notational convenience, we focus on monotone k-way disjunction queries.
However, our results extend straightforwardly to general non-monotone k-way
disjunction queries (see Section 4.1), which are equivalent to k-way marginals.
A monotone k-way disjunction is specied by a set S  [d] of size k and asks
what fraction of records in D have at least one of the attributes in S set to 1.
Our algorithm is inspired by a series of works reducing the problem of private
query release to various problems in learning theory. One ingredient in this
line of work is a shift in perspective introduced by Gupta, Hardt, Roth, and
Ullman [10]. Instead of viewing disjunction queries as a set of functions on the
database, they view the database as a function fD: f0;1gd ! [0;1], in which
each vector s 2 f0;1gd is interpreted as the indicator vector of a set S  [d], and
fD(s) equals the evaluation of the disjunction specied by S on the database D.
They use the structure of the functions fD to privately learn an approximation
gD that has small average error over any product distribution on disjunctions.1
Cheraghchi, Klivans, Kothari, and Lee [4] observed that the functions fD can
be approximated by a low-degree polynomial with small average error over the
uniform distribution on disjunctions. They then use a private learning algorithm
for low-degree polynomials to release an approximation to fD; and thereby obtain
an improved dependence on the accuracy parameter, as compared to [10].
Hardt, Rothblum, and Servedio [14] observe that fD is itself an average of
disjunctions (each row of D species a disjunction of bits in the indicator vec-
tor s 2 f0;1gd of the query), and thus develop private learning algorithms for
threshold of sums of disjunctions. These learning algorithms are also based on
low-degree approximations of sums of disjunctions. They show how to use their
private learning algorithms to obtain a sanitizer with small average error over
arbitrary distributions with running time and minimum database size dO(
p
k).
They then are able to apply the private boosting technique of Dwork, Roth-
blum, and Vadhan [9] to obtain worst-case accuracy guarantees. Unfortunately,
the boosting step incurs a blowup of dk in the running time.
We improve the above results by showing how to directly compute (a noisy
version of) a polynomial pD that is privacy-preserving and still approximates
fD on all k-way disjunctions, as long as jDj is suciently large. Specically, the
running time and the database size requirement of our algorithm are both poly-
nomial in the number of monomials in pD, which is dO(
p
k). By \directly", we
mean that we compute pD from the database D itself and perturb its coecients,
1 In their learning algorithm, privacy is dened with respect to the rows of the database
D that denes fD, not with respect to the examples given to the learning algorithm
(unlike earlier works on \private learning" [15]).rather than using a learning algorithm. Our construction of the polynomial pD
uses the same low-degree approximations exploited by Hardt et. al. in the de-
velopment of their private learning algorithms.
In summary, the main dierence between prior work and ours is that prior
work used learning algorithms that have restricted access to the database, and
released the hypothesis output by the learning algorithm. In contrast, we do
not make use of any learning algorithms, and give our release algorithm direct
access to the database. This enables our algorithm to achieve a worst-case error
guarantee while maintaining a minimal database size and running time much
smaller than the size of the query set. Our algorithm is also substantially simpler
than that of Hardt et. al.
We also consider other families of counting queries. We dene the class of
r-of-k queries. Like a monotone k-way disjunction, an r-of-k query is dened by
a set S  [d] such that jSj  k. The query asks what fraction of the rows of D
have at least r of the attributes in S set to 1. For r = 1, these queries are exactly
monotone k-way disjunctions, and r-of-k queries are a strict generalization.
Theorem 2 (Releasing r-of-k Queries). For every r;k;d;n 2 N with r  k 
d, every  2 (0;1], and every " > 0 there is an "-dierentially private sanitizer
that, on input a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, runs in time jDjd
~ O
p
rk log(1=)

and
releases a summary that enables computing each of the r-of-k queries on D up
to an additive error of at most , provided that jDj  d
~ O
p
rk log(1=)

=".
Note that monotone k-way disjunctions are just r-of-k queries where r = 1, thus
Theorem 2 implies a release algorithm for disjunctions with quadratically better
dependence on log(1=), at the cost of slightly worse dependence on k (implicit
in the switch from O() to ~ O()).
Finally, we present a sanitizer for privately releasing databases in which the
rows of the database are interpreted as decision lists, and the queries are inputs
to the decision lists. That is, instead of each record in D being a string of d
attributes, each record is an element of the set DLk;m, which consists of all
length-k decision lists over m input variables. (See Section 4.3 for a precise
denition.) A query is specied by a string y 2 f0;1gd and asks \What fraction
of database participants would make a certain decision based on the input y?"
As an example application, consider a database that allows high school stu-
dents to express their preferences for colleges in the form of a decision list. For
example, a student may say, \If the school is ranked in the top ten nationwide,
I am willing to apply to it. Otherwise, if the school is rural, I am unwilling to
apply. Otherwise, if the school has a good basketball team then I am willing to
apply to it." And so on. Each student is allowed to use up to k attributes out
of a set of m binary attributes. Our sanitizer allows any college (represented by
its m binary attributes) to determine the fraction of students willing to apply.
Theorem 3 (Releasing Decision Lists). For any k;m 2 N s.t. k  m, any
 2 (0;1], and any " > 1=n, there is an "-dierentially private sanitizer with
running time m
~ O(
p
k log(1=)) that, on input a database D 2 (DLk;m)n, releasesa summary that enables computing any length-k decision list query up to an
additive error of at most  on every query, provided that jDj  m
~ O(
p
k log(1=))=".
For comparison, we note that all the results on releasing k-way disjunctions
(including ours) also apply to a dual setting where the database records specify
a k-way disjunction over m bits and the queries are m-bit strings (in this setting
m plays the role of d). Theorem 3 generalizes this dual version of Theorem 1, as
length-k decision lists are a strict generalization of k-way disjunctions.
We prove the latter two results (Theorems 2 and 3) using the same approach
outlined for marginals (Theorem 1), but with dierent low-degree polynomial
approximations appropriate for the dierent types of queries.
Paper Running Time Database Size Error Type
a Synthetic Data?
[5,8,2,6] d
O(k) O(d
k=2=) Worst case N
[1] 2
O(d) O(d
k=2=) Worst case Y
[3,7,9,12] 2
O(d) ~ O(k
p
d=
2) Worst case Y
[10] d
~ O(1=2) d
~ O(1=2) Product Dists. N
[4] d
O(log(1=)) d
O(log(1=)) Uniform Dist.
b N
[14] d
O(d1=3 log(1=)) d
O(d1=3 log(1=)) Any Dist. N
[14] d
O(k) d
O(d1=3 log(1=)) Worst case N
[14] d
O(
p
k log(1=)) d
O(
p
k log(1=)) Any Dist. N
[14] d
O(k) d
O(
p
k log(1=)) Worst case N
This paper d
O(
p
k log(1=)) d
O(
p
k log(1=)) Worst case N
Table 1. Summary of prior results on dierentially private release of k-way marginals.
The database size column indicates the minimum database size required to release an-
swers to k-way marginals up to an additive error of . For clarity, we ignore the depen-
dence on the privacy parameters and the failure probability of the algorithms. Notice
that this paper contains the rst algorithm capable of releasing k-way marginals with
running time and worst-case error substantially smaller than the number of queries.
a Worst case error indicates that the accuracy guarantee holds for every marginal. The
other types of error indicate that accuracy holds for random marginals over a given
distribution from a particular class of distributions (e.g. product distributions).
b The results of [4] apply only to the uniform distribution over all marginals.
On Synthetic Data. An attractive type of summary is a synthetic database. A
synthetic database is a new database b D 2 (f0;1gd)b n whose rows are \fake",
but such that b D approximately preserves many of the statistical properties of
the database D (e.g. all the marginals). Some of the previous work on counting
query release has provided synthetic data, starting with Barak et. al. [1] and
including [3,7,9,12].
Unfortunately, Ullman and Vadhan [20] (building on [7]) have shown that
no dierentially private sanitizer with running time dO(1) can take a database
D 2 (f0;1gd)n and output a private synthetic database b D, all of whose 2-way
marginals are approximately equal to those of D (assuming the existence of one-
way functions). They also showed that there is a constant k 2 N such that nodierentially private sanitizer with running time 2d
1 
(1)
can output a private
synthetic database, all of whose k-way marginals are approximately equal to
those of D (under stronger cryptographic assumptions).
When k = d, our sanitizer runs in time 2
~ O(
p
d) and releases a private sum-
mary that enables an analyst to approximately answer any marginal query on
D. Prior to our work it was not known how to release any summary enabling ap-
proximate answers to all marginals in time 2d
1 
(1)
. Thus, our results show that
releasing a private summary for all marginal queries can be done considerably
more eciently if we do not require the summary to be a synthetic database
(under the hardness assumptions made in [20]).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Dierentially Private Sanitizers
Let a database D 2 X n be a collection of n rows x(1);:::;x(n) from a data
universe X. We say that two databases D1;D2 2 X n are adjacent if they dier
only on a single row, and we denote this by D1  D2.
A sanitizer A : X n ! R takes a database as input and outputs some data
structure in R. We are interested in sanitizers that satisfy dierential privacy.
Denition 4 (Dierential Privacy [6]). A sanitizer A: X n ! R is (";)-
dierentially private if for every two adjacent databases D;D0 2 X n and every
subset S  R, Pr[A(D) 2 S]  e" Pr[A(D0) 2 S] + : In the case where  = 0
we say that A is "-dierentially private.
Since a sanitizer that always outputs ? satises Denition 4, we also need to
dene what it means for a sanitizer to be accurate. In particular, we are interested
in sanitizers that give accurate answers to counting queries. A counting query is
dened by a boolean predicate q: X ! f0;1g. We dene the evaluation of the
query q on a database D 2 X n to be q(D) = 1
n
Pn
i=1 q(x(i)): We use Q to denote
a set of counting queries.
Since A may output an arbitrary data structure, we must specify how to
answer queries in Q from the output A(D). Hence, we require that there is an
evaluator E : R  Q ! R that estimates q(D) from the output of A(D). For
example, if A outputs a vector of \noisy answers" Z = (q(D) + Zq)q2Q, where
Zq is a random variable for each q 2 Q, then R = RQ and E(Z;q) is the q-th
component of Z. Abusing notation, we write q(Z) and q(A(D)) as shorthand for
E(Z;q) and E(A(D);q), respectively. Since we are interested in the eciency of
the sanitization process as a whole, when we refer to the running time of A, we
also include the running time of the evaluator E. We say that A is \accurate" for
the query set Q if the values q(A(D)) are close to the answers q(D). Formally,
Denition 5 (Accuracy). An output Z of a sanitizer A(D) is -accurate for
the query set Q if jq(Z)   q(D)j   for every q 2 Q. A sanitizer is (;)-
accurate for the query set Q if for every database D,
Pr[8q 2 Q;jq(A(D))   q(D)j  ]  1   ;where the probability is taken over the coins of A.
We will make use of the Laplace mechanism. Let Lap
k() denote a draw from
the random variable over Rk in which each coordinate is chosen independently
according to the density function Lap(x) / e jxj=. Let D 2 X n be a database
and g : X n ! Rk be a function such that for every pair of adjacent databases
D  D0, kg(D)   g(D0)k1  : Then we have the following two theorems:
Lemma 6 (Laplace Mechanism, "-Dierential Privacy [6]). For D;g;k;
as above, the mechanism A(D) = g(D)+Lap
k(k=") satises "-dierential pri-
vacy. Furthermore, for any  > 0, PrA [kg(D)   A(D)k1  ]  1   ; for
 = 2k2 log(k=)=":
The choice of the L1 norm in the accuracy guarantee of the lemma is for conve-
nience, and doesn't matter for the parameters of Theorems 1-3 (except for the
hidden constants).
2.2 Query Function Families
We take the approach of Gupta et. al. [10] and think of the database D as
specifying a function fD mapping queries q to their answers q(D), which we call
the Q-representation of D. We now describe this transformation more formally:
Denition 7 (Q-Function Family). Let Q = fqygy2YQf0;1gm be a set of
counting queries on a data universe X, where each query is indexed by an m-bit
string. We dene the index set of Q to be the set YQ = fy 2 f0;1gm j qy 2 Qg.
We dene the Q-function family FQ = ffx : f0;1gm ! f0;1ggx2X as fol-
lows: For every possible database row x 2 X, the function fQ;x : f0;1gm ! f0;1g
is dened as fQ;x(y) = qy(x). Given a database D 2 X n we dene the function
fQ;D : f0;1gm ! [0;1] where fQ;D(q) = 1
n
Pn
i=1 fQ;x(i)(q). When Q is clear
from context we will drop the subscript Q and simply write fx, fD, and F.
For some intuition about this transformation, when the queries are monotone
k-way disjunctions on a database D 2 (f0;1gd)n, the queries are dened by sets
S  [d] , jSj  k. In this case each query can be represented by the d-bit indicator
vector of the set S, with at most k non-zero entries. Thus we can take m = d
and YQ =
n
y 2 f0;1gd j
Pd
j=1 yj  k
o
.
2.3 Polynomial Approximations
An m-variate real polynomial p 2 R[y1;:::;ym] of degree t and (L1) norm T
can be written as p(y) =
P
j1;:::;jm0
j1++jmt
cj1;:::;jm
Qm
`=1 y
j`
` where jcj1;:::;jmj  T for
every j1;:::;jm. Recall that there are at most
 m+t
t

coecients in an m-variate
polynomial of total degree t. Often we will want to associate a polynomial p of
degree t and norm T with its coecient vector p 2 [ T;T](
m+t
t ). Specically,
p = (cj1;:::;jm) j1;:::;jm0
j1++jmt
: Given a vector p and a point y 2 f0;1gm we use p(y)to indicate the evaluation of the polynomial described by the vector p at the
point y. Observe this is equivalent to computing p  y where y 2 f0;1g(
m+t
t ) is
dened as yj1;:::;jm =
Qm
`=1 y
j`
` for every j1;:::;jm  0, j1 +  + jm  t.
Let Pt;T be the family of all m-variate real polynomials of degree t and norm
T. In many cases, the functions fQ;x : f0;1gm ! f0;1g can be approximated
well on all the indices in YQ by a family of polynomials Pt;T with low degree
and small norm. Formally:
Denition 8 (Uniform Approximation by Polynomials). Given a family
of m-variate functions F = ffxgx2X and a set Y  f0;1gm, we say that the
family Pt;T uniformly -approximates F on Y if for every x 2 X, there exists
px 2 Pt;T such that maxy2Y jfx(y)   px(y)j  .
We say that Pt;T eciently and uniformly -approximates F if there is an
algorithm PF that takes x 2 X as input, runs in time poly(logjXj;
 m+t
t

;logT),
and outputs a coecient vector px such that maxy2Y jfx(y)   px(y)j  .
3 From Polynomial Approximations to Data Release
Algorithms
In this section we present an algorithm for privately releasing any family of
counting queries Q such that FQ that can be eciently and uniformly approx-
imated by polynomials. The algorithm will take an n-row database D and, for
each row x 2 D, constructs a polynomial px that uniformly approximates the
function fQ;x (recall that fQ;x(q) = q(x), for each q 2 Q). From these, it con-
structs a polynomial pD = 1
n
P
x2D px that uniformly approximates fQ;D. The
nal step is to perturb each of the coecients of pD using noise from a Laplace
distribution (Theorem 6) and bound the error introduced from the perturbation.
Theorem 9 (Releasing Polynomials). Let Q = fqygy2YQf0;1gm be a set of
counting queries over f0;1gd, and FQ be the Q function family (Denition 7).
Assume that Pt;T eciently and uniformly -approximates FQ on YQ (Deni-
tion 8). Then there is a sanitizer A: (f0;1gd)n ! R(
m+t
t ) that
1. is "-dierentially private,
2. runs in time poly(n;d;
 m+t
t

;logT;log(1=")), and
3. is (;)-accurate for Q for  =  +
4T(
m+t
t )
2
log((
m+t
t )=)
"n :
Proof. First we construct the sanitizer A. See the relevant codebox below.
Privacy. We establish that A is "-dierentially private. This follows from the
observation that for any two adjacent D  D0 that dier only on row i,
kpD   pD0k1 =
 

 
1
n
n X
i=1
px(i)  
1
n
n X
i=1
px0(i)
 

 
1
=
1
n
kpx(i)   px0(i)k1 
2T
n
:The Sanitizer A
Input: A database D 2 (f0;1g
d)
n, an explicit family of polynomials P, and a pa-
rameter " > 0.
For i = 1;:::;n
Using ecient approximation of F by P, compute a polynomial px(i) = PF(x
(i))
that -approximates fx(i) on YQ.
Let pD =
1
n
Pn
i=1 px(i), where the sum denotes standard entry-wise vector addition.
Let ~ pD = pD + Z, where Z is drawn from an
 m+t
t

-variate Laplace distribution
with parameter 2T="n (Section 2.1).
Output: ~ pD.
The last inequality is from the fact that for every x, px is a vector of L1 norm
at most T. Part 1 of the Theorem now follows directly from the properties of
the Laplace Mechanism (Theorem 6). Now we construct the evaluator E.
The Evaluator E for the Sanitizer A
Input: A vector ~ p 2 R(
m+t
t ) and the description of a query y 2 f0;1g
m.
Output: ~ p(y). Recall that we view ~ p as an m-variate polynomial, p, and ~ p(y) is the
evaluation of p on the point y.
Eciency. Next, we show that A runs in time poly(n;d;
 m+t
t

;logT;log(1=")).
Recall that we assumed the polynomial construction algorithm P runs in time
poly(d;
 m+t
t

;logT). The algorithm A needs to run PF on each of the n rows,
and then it needs to generate
 m+t
t

samples from a univariate Laplace dis-
tribution with magnitude poly(T;
 m+t
t

;1=n;1="), which can also be done in
time poly(
 m+t
t

;logT;logn;log(1=")). We also establish that E runs in time
poly(
 m+t
t

;logT;logn;log(1=")), observe that E needs to expand the input into
an appropriate vector of dimension
 m+t
t

and take the inner product with the
vector ~ p, whose entries have magnitude poly(
 m+t
t

;T;1=n;1="). These observa-
tions establish Part 2 of the Theorem.
Accuracy. Finally, we analyze the accuracy of the sanitizer A. First, by the
assumption that Pt;T uniformly -approximates F on Y  f0;1gm, we have
max
y2Y
jfD(y)   pD(y)j 
1
n
n X
i=1
max
y2Y
jfx(i)(y)   px(i)(y)j  :
Now we want to establish that Pr

maxy2f0;1gm j~ pD(y)   pD(y)j  0
 1   
for 0 = 4T
 m+t
t
2
log
  m+t
t

=

="n, where the probability is taken over the
coins of A. Part (3) of the Theorem will then follow by the triangle inequality.
To see that the above statement is true, observe that by the properties of the
Laplace mechanism (Theorem 6), we have Pr[k~ pD   pDk1  0]  1 ; where
the probability is taken over the coins of A. Given that k~ pD   pDk1  0, itholds that for every y 2 f0;1gm,
j~ pD(y)   pD(y)j = j(~ pD   pD)(y)j  k~ pD   pDk1  0:
The rst inequality follows from the fact that every monomial evaluates to 0 or
1 at the point y. This completes the proof of the theorem.
4 Applications
In this section we establish the existence of explicit families of low-degree poly-
nomials approximating the families FQ for some interesting query sets.
4.1 Releasing Monotone Disjunctions
We dene the class of monotone k-way disjunctions as follows:
Denition 10 (Monotone k-Way Disjunctions). Let X = f0;1gd. The
query set QDisj;k = fqygy2Ykf0;1gd of monotone k-way disjunctions over f0;1gd
contains a query qy for every y 2 Yk =

y 2 f0;1gd j jyj  k
	
. Each query is
dened as qy(x1;:::;xd) =
Wd
j=1 yjxj. The QDisj;k function family FQDisj;k =
ffxgx2f0;1gd contains a function fx(y1;:::;yd) =
Wd
j=1 yjxj for every x 2 f0;1gd.
Thus the family FQDisj;k consists of all disjunctions, and the index set, Yk,
consists of all vectors y 2 f0;1gd with at most k non-zero entries.
The next lemma shows that FQDisj;k can be eciently and uniformly ap-
proximated by polynomials of low degree and low norm. The statement is a
well-known application of Chebyshev polynomials, and a similar statement ap-
pears in [14] but without bounding the running time of the construction or a
bound on the norm of the polynomials.
Lemma 11 (Approximating FQDisj;k by polynomials, similar to [14]).
For every k;d 2 N such that k  d and every  > 0, the family Pt;T of d-variate
real polynomials of degree t = O(
p
klog(1=)) and norm T = dO(
p
k log(1=))
eciently and uniformly -approximates the family FQDisj;k on the set Yk.
Theorem 1 in the introduction follows by combining Theorems 9 and 11.
4.2 Releasing Monotone r-of-k Queries
We dene the class of monotone r-of-k queries as follows:
Denition 12 (Monotone r-of-k Queries). Let X = f0;1gd and r;k 2 N
such that r  k  d. The query set Qr;k = fqygy2Ykf0;1gd of monotone r-of-k
queries over f0;1gd contains a query qy for every y 2 Yk =

y 2 f0;1gd j jyj  k
	
.
Each query is dened as qy(x1;:::;xd) = 1Pd
j=1 yjxjr. The Qr;k function family
FQr;k = ffxgx2f0;1gd contains a function fx(y1;:::;yd) = 1Pd
j=1 yjxjr for every
x 2 f0;1gd.The next lemma shows that FQr;k can be eciently and uniformly approxi-
mated over Yk by low-degree polynomials. The statement is based on approximation-
theoretic results of Sherstov [18, Lemma 3.11].
Lemma 13 (Approximating FQr;k on Yk). For every r;k;d 2 N such that
r  k  d and every  > 0, the family Pt;T of d-variate real polynomials of degree
t = ~ O(
p
krlog(1=)) and norm T = d
~ O(
p
kr log(1=)) eciently and uniformly
-approximates the family FQr;k on the set Yk.
Remark 1. Using the principle of inclusion-exclusion, the answer to a monotone
r-of-k query can be written as a linear combination of the answers to kO(r)
monotone k-way disjunctions. Thus, a sanitizer that is (=kO(r);)-accurate for
monotone k-way disjunctions implies a sanitizer that is (;)-accurate for mono-
tone r-of-k queries. However, combining this implication with Theorem 1 yields
a sanitizer with running time dO(r
p
k log(k=)), which has a worse dependence on
r than what we achieve in Theorem 2.
4.3 Releasing Decision Lists
A length-k decision list over m variables is a function which can be written in
the form \if `1 then output b1 else  else if `k then output bk else output bk+1,"
where each `i is a boolean literal in fx1;:::;xmg, and each bi is an output bit in
f0;1g: Note that decision lists of length-k strictly generalize k-way disjunctions
and conjunctions. We use DLk;m to denote the set of all length-k decision lists
over m binary input variables.
Denition 14 (Evaluations of Length-k Decision Lists). Let k;m 2 N
such that k  m and X = DLk;m. The query set QDLk;m = fqygy2f0;1gm of
evaluations of length-k decision lists contains a query qy for every y 2 f0;1gm.
Each query is dened as qy(x) = x(y) where x 2 DLk;m is a length-k decision list
over m variables. The QDLk;m function family FQDLk;m = ffxgx2DLk;m contains
functions fx(y) = x(y) for every x 2 DLk;m. That is, FQDLk;m = DLk;m.
We clarify that in this setting, the records in the database are length-k deci-
sion lists over f0;1gm and the queries inputs in f0;1gm. Thus jXj = jDLk;mj =
mO(k) and jQj = 2m. Alternatively, X = f0;1gd for d = k(logm + 2) + 1, since
a length-k decision list can be described using this many bits.
Lemma 15 ([16]). For every k;m 2 N such that k  m and every  > 0,
the family Pt;T of m-variate real polynomials of degree ~ O
p
klog(1=)

and
norm T = m
~ O(
p
k log(1=)) eciently and uniformly -approximates the family
FQDLk;m = DLk;m on all of f0;1gm.
We obtain Theorem 3 of the introduction by combining Theorems 9 and 15.
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